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THE PROSECUTION AT A LOHSS:
TIME FOR STATUTORY REVISION
In Lohss v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied the State
the right to appeal from dismissals of two indictments, because the State
had, by failing to object to the dismissals, waived any right to review it
might otherwise have had. Since the State's consent to the dismissals was
conditioned on the trial court's grant of defendants' pretrial motion to
suppress evidence and was, far from a voluntary abandonment of prosecu-
tion, no more than an admission of the state's unwillingness to prosecute
the case without the suppressed evidence, 2 the decision of the Court of
Appeals underscores what is commonly seen as a need for statutory revision.
1. 272 Md. 113, 321 A2d 534 (1974).
2. The rule that interlocutory orders are ordinarily not appealable until final
judgment was set out in Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 157 A. 723 (1931):
If, on a question left to the court's discretion . . . a prisoner is permitted to
take an immediate appeal, then proceedings in every criminal case, great or
small, may be stopped and delayed while the accused prosecutes an appeal ....
[T]his would add just so much to the resources of those who might find
vexatious delays advantageous, and would multiply appeals in criminal cases,
often when acquittals, in the end, would render them profitless.
Id. at 434, 157 A. at 724. There is a narrow exception to the rule where an order
denies an absolute constitutional right. See Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 322 A2d
887 (1974), and cases cited therein; Montgomery v. State, 4 Md. App. 473, 243
A.2d 620 (1968) (speedy trial); Stevenson v. State, 4 Md. App. 1, 241 A2d 174
(1968) (speedy trial); Brown v. State, 2 Md. App. 388, 234 A2d 788 (1967)
(double jeopardy).
Although a defendant has no right to an immediate appeal, the denial does
not foreclose the possibility of appeal altogether. Of course, if there is a verdict of
acquittal the issue becomes moot. In the event of a conviction, then appellate
review is open to the defendant under MD. R.P. 729(f) and (g) (2), and the accused
may obtain a reversal and new trial if the evidence were in fact, both illegally
obtained and so important to the State's case that its admission would be reversible
error.
The State may not appeal the grant of a motion to suppress after an acquittal
because of the double jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See note 61 infra. Although permitted
in a few other jurisdictions, in Maryland the State may not pursue a moot appeal,
because the situation in which it may appeal are limited by the statute. See note 42
infra. Following a conviction, the State similarly cannot appeal the grant of a motion
to suppress because it is again limited by the situations set forth in MD. ANN. CODE,
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-302(c) (1974), and as a practical matter, it would
already have achieved its goal, the conviction of the accused. In short, while the
defendant may appeal the denial of the motion after conviction, the State may not
appeal its grant after acquittal. Thus to oppose the dismissal is to ask to go to trial
with no evidence, while to acquiesce in the motion is to give up the right of review.
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Lohss and Sprenkle were jointly indicted for violation of the controlled
dangerous substance law.8 Before trial, the court found that evidence in
the form of contraband had been unlawfully obtained and granted the
defendants' motion to suppress it. As in many narcotics cases, the sup-
pression left the State without any useful evidence. Consequently, when
Lohss next moved to dismiss the indictment against him for want of admis-
sible evidence to support it, the State conceded, making "no objection" to
the order, and the indictment was dismissed.4 The State itself then moved
successfully to dismiss Sprenkle's indictment.
5
The State appealed the dismissals to the Court of Special Appeals,
basing the appeal on section 14 of Article 5 of the Maryland Code.6 The
Court of Special Appeals held, first, that it had jurisdiction under section
14 to hear the appeal and, second, that the grant of the pretrial motion
3. Defendants were arrested at Friendship Airport [now Baltimore-Washington
International] on the basis of communications from the Department of Public Safety
in Austin, Texas, that a passenger [Sprenkle] would be arriving in Baltimore with
three suitcases containing thirty pounds of marijuana. Following his arrival, Sprenkle
was met by Lohss and both were apprehended by the State Police. A search of
the suitcases revealed the contraband which was seized and became the subject of
the motion to suppress.
4. State v. Lohss, 19 Md. App. 489, 491-92, 313 A.2d 87, 89 (1973). The
record contains a notation on a piece of paper bearing the printed name of Judge
Evans [the trial judge]: "Mr. Anders [Assistant State's Attorney] concedes; no
objection to order." Id. at 492, 313 A2d at 89.
5. Id.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 14 (1966) provided:
The State may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final order
or judgment granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing any
indictment, information, presentment or inquisition in a criminal action, but
the State shall have no right of appeal in any criminal action where the defendant
has been tried and acquitted.
Article 5 was subsequently repealed by Acts of 1973, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2, effective
Jan. 1, 1974; 1974, ch. 691, § 1, effective July 1, 1974. The section is now recodified
as MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-302 (1974), which provides:
(a) Unless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does
not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court,
an administrative agency, or a local legislative body.
(b) Section 12-301 does not apply to appeals in contempt cases, which are
governed by §§ 12-304 and 12-403.
(c) In a criminal case, the state may appeal only from a final judgment
granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, in-
formation, presentment, or inquisition in a criminal case.
(d) Section 12-301 does not permit an appeal from the decision of the
judges of a circuit court sitting in banc pursuant to Article IV, § 22 of the
Constitution if the party seeking to appeal is the party who moved to have the
point or question reserved for consideration of the court in banc.
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to suppress evidence was erroneous.7 This Note, however, will be con-
fined to the jurisdictional question of the State's right to appeal the dis-
missal and will not address the substantive issue of the propriety of the
grant of the motion to suppress.
Under Maryland law a party's right to appeal in both civil and criminal
cases is entirely statutory.8 In Lohss, the Court of Special Appeals inter-
preted section 14 to give it jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State from
a dismissal of an indictment regardless of the cause of dismissal. The
Court of Special Appeals noted that it had already entertained appeals from
dismissals of indictments based on motions to suppress evidence ;9 how-
ever, the dismissals in all four of the cited cases1° resulted from defendant's
motion without consent or acquiescence by the State. While recognizing
the distincton, the court nevertheless ruled that the dear meaning of the
statute allows the appeal - the "only exception being where 'the defendant
has been tried and acquitted.' ,,1
Having found jurisdiction, the Court of Special Appeals then reviewed
the propriety of the grant of the motion to suppress under Maryland Rule
108712 and found that it had been improper.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals reversed.'8 While the court agreed with the
Court of Special Appeals that if the appeal were proper, the motion to
suppress could be reviewed under Rule 1087,'14 the State was nevertheless
denied a right to appeal on two grounds.
First, the State, by consenting to or acquiescing in the dismissals, lost
any rights of appeal it may have had under section 14. With only civil
cases' 5 as authority, the court felt that the State's actions amounted to an
7. 19 Md. App. at 494, 506, 313 A2d at 90, 94.
8. See, e.g., Mace Produce v. State's Attorney, 251 Md. 503, 508-09, 248 A2d346, 350 (1968); State v. Denisio, 21 Md. App. 159, 162, 318 A.2d 559, 561 (1974).
9. 19 Md. App. at 494, 313 A2d at 90.
10. State v. Graziano, 17 Md. App. 276, 301 A.2d 36 (1973); State v. Lee,16 Md. App. 296, 295 A2d 812 (1972); State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A2d671 (1971) ; State v. Swales, 12 Md. App. 69, 277 A2d 449 (1971).
11. 19 Md. App. at 494, 313 A2d at 90 (emphasis in original).
12. MD. R.P. 1087, concerning the reviewability of interlocutory orders, provides:On an appeal from a final judgment, every interlocutory order which has pre-
viously been entered in the action shall be open to review by this Court unless
an appeal has theretofore been taken from such interlocutory order and been
decided on the merits by this Court.
13. Lohss v. State, 272 Md. 113, 321 A.2d 534 (1974).
14. Id. at 118, 321 A2d at 537.
15. Enumerated, id. at 118-19, 321 A.2d at 538.
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abandonment of its prosecution, analogous to entering a nolle prosequi.'6
The ruling of the court on'the question rests on the maxim of jurisprudence
that no appeal will lie without genuine adversity.
The second articulated ground for reversal was the State's failure to
fulfill the requirements of Maryland Rule 1085.17 The court ruled that,
by not questioning the propriety of the dismissals, the State had waived
its right of review on the motion.18 Although the authority relied on by
the Court of Appeals concerns the waiver by defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings, the State is also bound by the rule.19 Although both appellate
courts recognized the State's need for review of a pretrial motion to sup-
press evidence, the Court of Appeals expressly refused to supply a right
of appeal to the State and suggested, not for the first time, that "[ilf a
broader right of review is necessary in the interest of criminal justice, it
must be granted by the legislature." 20
The first case involving the State's appeal from the grant of a motion
to suppress evidence was State v. Mariana.2 1 There the Court of Appeals
did indeed reverse a judgment of acquittal because of the erroneous grant
of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence; however, no motion to dismiss
the State's appeal was made and the right to appeal was not mentioned
in the opinion.
State v. Adams22 was the first case to deal explicity with the State's
right to appeal. The Court of Appeals distinguished Mariana, as above,
16. 272 Md. at 119, 321 A.2d at 538.
17. MD. R.P. 1085 provides:
This Court will not ordinarily decide any point or question which does not
plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court;
but where a point or question of law was presented to the lower court and a
decision of such point or question of law by this Court is necessary or desirable
for the guidance of the lower court or to avoid the expense and delay of another
appeal to this Court, such point or question of law may be decided by this Court
even though not decided by the lower court. Where jurisdiction cannot be
conferred on the Court by waiver or consent of the parties, a question as to
the jurisdiction of the lower court may be raised and decided in this Court
whether or not raised and decided in the lower court.
18. 272 Md. at 119, 321 A.2d at 538.
19. Id.
20. 272 Md. at 120, 321 A2d at 539.
21. 174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938). This case is discussed in Note, Appeals by
the State in Criminal Cases, 4 MD. L. REv. 303 (1940).
22. 196 Md. 341, 76 A.2d 575 (1950). The defendant had been acquitted on
indictments that charged violations of the gambling laws. Before trial, defendant
had moved to dismiss the indictments, but the court of appeals held these motions
to be effectively motions to suppress evidence. At the end of the testimony, the
trial judge held the arrest, search, and seizure illegal and rendered a verdict of
not guilty. The court held that under Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1939),
the issue of an appeal did not involve any constitutional question. The court having
decided that, the case turned on statutory construction.
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and dismissed the appeal. The State had argued that the motion to sup-
press was equivalent to a demurrer to an indictment and, therefore, appeal-
able under the statute,23 yet the court discounted the assertion as unsound
both in law and in fact and stated that the distinction between cases which
the State may appeal and those which it cannot is purely historical - based
on whether the case is reviewable on writ of error or not. 24 The motion
to suppress did not fall within the category of motions so reviewable, and,
therefore, the statute allowed no appeal from such a notion.
The following year the state again attempted to circumvent the statute
in State v. Barshack.25 A defendant moved to quash a search warrant
and the court granted the motion and a continuance. The State appealed
on two points: first, while technically the grant of the motion was not
final as required by the statute,26 the State argued that the practical effect
of the grant was to foreclose further prosecution; second, the State argued
that the grant of a continuance enlarged the right of review.2 7 The Court
of Appeals denied the State the right of review on the first contention,
following the holding of State v. Adams28 and did not discuss the merits
of the second.
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 86 (1939), provided:
The parties to criminal proceedings shall be entitled to bills of exceptions in
the same manner as in civil proceedings, and appeals from judgments in
criminal cases may be taken in the same manner as in civil cases; but no
appeal in a criminal case shall stay execution of sentence unless the counsel for
the accused shall make oath that the appeal is not taken for delay; and such
appeal shall be heard at the earliest convenient day after the same shall have
been transmitted to the court of appeals; and the accused, upon taking such
appeal, shall, in all cases not punishable by death, or imprisonment in the
penitentiary, be entitled to remain on bail, and in other cases not capital, the
court from which the appeal is taken shall have the discretionary power to
admit to bail; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
prohibit the court from requiring additional or greater bail, pending an appeal,
than the accused may already have given before conviction.
24. 196 Md. at 349-50, 76 A.2d at 578.
25. 197 Md. 543, 80 A.2d 32 (1951).
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 86 (1951).
27. The continuance was given ostensibly to allow the State to appeal. The
trial judge, Judge Manley, after granting the motion to suppress, spoke to the
prosecution:
I will grant the motion and I will take any other procedure in the case that is,
for further disposition of it, that you might suggest, so that the State will not lose
its right to appeal. In other words, I will be glad to handle it in such a way
that might preserve your right to appeal. I will follow any suggestion you have
to make as to what to do in order to preserve the right of the State to take
an appeal.
Brief for Appellant at app. 15-16. Judge Manley expressed doubts whether the
State could appeal before a verdict - doubts that were borne out on appeal - but
allowed the continuance so that the State might try it.
28. 196 Md. 341, 76 A.2d 575 (1950).
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Eighteen years later the issue was raised again in the Court of Special
Appeals in State v. Mather.29 In that interval, the legislature had repealed
all prior statutes regulating the right of appeal in criminal cases and en-
acted article 5, section 14 of the Code.30 In Mather, the defendant moved
to suppress evidence, and the motion was granted. The State appealed
and again argued, as it had before the Court of Appeals in Adams and
Barshack, that the grant of the motion was tantamount to terminating the
prosecution and discharging the defendant ;31 and as the Court of Appeals
had in Adams and Barshack, the Court of Special Appeals denied the
appeal, ruling that section 14 had not further enlarged the State's right
of appeal. The second argument essayed by the State was that the "inquisi-
tion" in section 14 was broad enough in meaning to include the judicial
inquiry adjudicating the motion to suppress. According to the Court of
Special Appeals, however, no construction of the term inquisition was
broad enough to grant the State a new right of appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals in State v. SiegeP2 reaffirmed the
principle that the State has no right of appeal from the granting of a
motion to suppress evidence, but the court also suggested an alternative
means of securing review by the State that has not yet been litigated in
Maryland.33 This suggestion is reiterated in State v. Graziano.3 4 The
potential ground for appeal comes from two federal cases.85 In United
States v. Tane, the Second Circuit held that where "the basis of the dis-
missal of the indictment is inextricably intertwined with the basis of the
suppression order, both orders must be reviewed together," 36 but of
course, this federal decision does not bind Maryland courts. In United
States v. Dote, defendants made a motion to suppress. After a full hear-
ing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment as
well, finding that but for the illegally obtained evidence, no indictment
would have been returned. 7 In Tane, defendant made both a motion to
suppress and a motion to dismiss the indictment. After several hearings,
the trial court granted both motions.38 The clear implication of Siegel and
29. 7 Md. App. 549, 256 A2d 532 (1969).
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 14 (1966), set out at note 6 supra.
31. 7 Md. App. at 552, 256 A2d at 533-34.
32. 13 Md. App. 444, 470-71, 285 A2d 671, 686 (1971).
33. Id. at 471 n.28, 285 A2d at 686 n28.
34. 17 Md. App. 276, 284 & n.1, 301 A2d 36, 41 & n.1 (1973).
35. United States V. Dote, 371 F2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964).
36. 329 F.2d at 851-51a
37. 371 F.2d at 178.
38. 329 F2d at 849-52.
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Graziano, which seems untouched by the reversal of Lohss, is that under
the proper factual circumstances the State may yet, using the Dote-Tane
doctrine, acquire a right of review on a motion to suppress evidence that
it does not presently enjoy. The right of review would not be unlimited,
because in the situation where the defendant moves only to suppress and
makes no motion to dismiss the indictment, the State, according to Lohss,
would have no right of review. Similarly, the Dote-Tane doctrine would
not cover the situation where the suppression order affects only a portion
of an indictment. In that instance the State, using the Dote-Tane theory,
could obtain review on the affected counts only after entering a nolle
prosequi on the unaffected counts.8 9 The effect would be to force the
State to risk the complete dismissal of the case in order to obtain the right
of review on the affected counts, a situation that could create more prob-
lems than it would solve.
It is clear that, while Lohss has frustrated another attempt by the
State to circumvent the plain meaning of section 14, the decision has not
resolved the question entirely. As long as section 12-302 (c) remains as
the codification of the State's right to appeal, the issue can be expected
to reappear again as the State takes yet another tack, either the one sug-
gested by the sympathetic court in Siegel or as the State's ingenuity and
the facts of future cases suggest, in order to secure the right of appeal
from the pretrial grant of a suppression order.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other states vary in their procedures for appeal by the prosecution
following the issuance of a suppression order. Two states disallow the
state the right of appeal by constitutional provision.40 Fourteen states
allow the state some right of appeal, but do not extend that right to include
pretrial motions to suppress evidence.4 1 Five states allow the state a
right to a moot appeal, the appeal being only for an advisory opinion, and
the judgment at the appellate level in no way affects the rights of the de-
39. See State v. Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236, 240 n.1, 242 A.2d 575, 578 n.1 (1968).
40. TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 26; VA. CONST. art. 6, § 88.
41. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 370 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. § 22.05.010 (1959); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-2304 (Supp. 1974); Ky. REv. STAT. § 21.140 (1974); MD. ANN.
CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 12-302(c) (1974); Mo. R. CRrm. P. 28.04; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-174 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07 (1974); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 7-101 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-51-2 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-3401 (1950) (but see TENN. CR. CODE & CODE CalM. P. § 40-1408 (Proposed
final draft, Nov. 1973)); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-39-4 (1953); WASH. CAROA
14(8), construed in State v. Rook, 9 Wash. App. 826, 515 P2d 830 (1973) ; W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 51-1-3 (1966).
19751
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fendant. 42 Five states allow appeals by the state with leave of the court
following the grant of a motion to suppress.4" The remaining twenty-five
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, specifically allow the
state the right to appeal in such situations.44 The clear trend has been
towards allowing the state the right of appeal. Since Illinois first allowed
appeals by the state in 1964, twenty-three states have followed that state's
lead.
Unless the suppressed evidence was seized drugs45 or the Dote-Tane
distinction could be successfully argued, the United States had no right
under federal law to appeal a suppression order until the Allot Amend-
42. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2720.1 (Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 793.1
(Supp. 1974) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-103 (1972) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2315.01,
29-2316 (reissue 1964) ; WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-288 to 7-291 (1957).
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 9903 (1974); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 770.12 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
491: App. R. 88 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7403 (1974).
44. ARIZ. R. CRIm. P. 31.16; CAL. ANN. PENAL CODE § 1238(a) (7) (West
Supp.); COLO. R. CRIm. P. 41.2; D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-105(b) (Supp.
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.071 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 6-1001(a) (Supp.
1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 641-12 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 19-2804 (Supp.
1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 604(a) (1968); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3603
(Supp. 1972); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 703 (1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2115-A (Supp. 1974); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 28E (Supp. 1974); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 632.11 (1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2403(b)(5) (1969);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 189.120 (1973); N.J. R. CRIM. P. 3:24; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-10-2.1 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 45020(8), 450.50 (McKinney 1971);
OnIo R. Calm. P. 12(J); State v. Caldwell, 496 P.2d 426 (Okla. Cr. 1972); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 138.060(3) (1973); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115
(1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-5.1-12.5(d) (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 974.05(1) (d) (1969).
45. Narcotics Control Act, ch. 629, title II, § 201, 70 Stat. 573, provided:
In addition to any other right to appeal, the United States shall have the
right to appeal from an order granting a motion for the return of seized
property and to suppress evidence made before the trial of a person charged
with a violation of-
(1) any provision of part I or part II of subchapter A of chapter 39
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 the penalty for which is provided in
subsection (a) or (b) of section 7237 of such Code,
(2) subsection (c), (h), or (i) of section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act, as amended (21 U.S.C., sec. 174), or
(3) the Act of July 11, 1941, as amended (21 U.S.C., sec. 184a).
This section shall not apply with respect to any such motion unless the United
States attorney shall certify, to the judge granting such motion, that the appeal
is not taken for purposes of delay. Any appeal under this section shall be taken
within 30 days after the date the order was entered and shall be diligently
prosecuted.
The government's right to appeal in narcotics cases is now included in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1970). See note 47 infra.
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ment to the Criminal Appeals Act of 190748 was passed. The amend-
ment,47 and the recommendations of the President's Commission on Law
46. Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, as amended, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 844 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964)) :
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the
district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal
cases in the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment
or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is
based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the
indictment or information is founded.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of
the indictment or information, where such decision is based upon the
invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or
information is founded.
From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the
defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the
district courts to a court of appeals in all criminal cases, in the following
instances :
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indict-
ment or information, or any count thereof except where a direct appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this section.
From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this
section.
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the decision
or judgment has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.
Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal in the foregoing
instances, the defendant shall be admitted to bail on his own recognizance.
If an appeal shall be taken, pursuant to this section, to the Supreme Court
of the United States which, in the opinion of that Court, should have been
taken to a court of appeals, the Supreme Court shall remand the case to the
court of appeals, which shall then have jurisdiction to hear and determine the same
as if the appeal had been taken to that court in the first instance.
If an appeal shall be taken pursuant to this section to any court of appeals
which, in the opinion of such court, should have been taken directly to the
Supreme Court of the United States, such court shall certify the case to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which shall thereupon have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the case to the same extent as if an appeal had been
taken directly to that Court.
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1968) Pub. L. 90-351 added a paragraph to the existing codification:
From an order, granting a motion for return of seized property or a
motion to suppress evidence, made before the trial of a person charged with
a violation of any law of the United States, if the United States attorney
certifies to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for
purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge
pending against the defendant.
For a discussion of the pre-amendment statute, see Friedenthal, Government Appeals
in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 71 (1959).
47. For an extensive discussion of the legislative history of the Criminal Appeals
Act of 1907, see Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Criminal Appeals Act: A
Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. Clii. L. Rav. 419 (1961). Congress
1975]
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Enforcement and Administration of Justice48 and those of the American Bar
Association 49 have doubtless given some impetus to the movement. In
amended the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 again in 1971 in an attempt to clarify
the earlier codification which had been developed in a piecemeal fashion:
§ 3731. Appeal by United States.
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of
appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal
shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits further prosecution.
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision or order of a district court's suppressing or excluding evidence or
requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after
the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an
indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district
court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence
is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the
decision, judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.
Pending the prosecution and determination of the appeal in the foregoing
instances, the defendant shall be released in accordance with chapter 207 of
this title.
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate
its purposes.
Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890, amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1968).
The amendment broadens the scope of appeal by eliminating the common
law terms of the former law and establishes double jeopardy as the only limitation
to governmental appeal. The second paragraph, which in part applies to suppression
orders, retains the certification-of-substantial proof requirement of the old law, but
modifies the use to which the evidence must be put from "proof of the charge
pending against the defendant" to "proof of a fact material to the proceeding."
The thirty-day rule and the bail provisions of the former law were left unchanged
by the new third and fourth paragraphs. The fifth paragraph introduces a liberal
construction provision in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute. This pro-
vision is a response to the strict construction by the federal courts in earlier cases
requiring construction of the statute. See United States v. Mersky, 261 F.2d 40
(2d Cir. 1958); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 395 (1957); United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970). In Sisson, the Court seemingly recognized a need for
revision: the majority opinion stated, "until such time as Congress decides to amend
the statute, this Court must abide by the limitations imposed by this awkward and
ancient statute." 399 U.S. at 308.
For a more complete discussion of the 1970 amendment to the statute, see
Note, Government Appeal in Criminal Prosecutions: The 1970 Amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 3731, 12 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 539 (1975).
48. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTicE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE SociETY (1967).
The Commission recommended:
Congress and the States should enact statutes giving the prosecution the right
to appeal from the grant of all pre-trial motions to suppress evidence or
confessions.
Id. at 140.
49. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIM. APPEALS 33-34 (Approved Draft
1970).
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order to eliminate the state's dilemma in a situation like that in Lohss,
Maryland should join the trend by allowing the state an interlocutory
appeal from a pretrial suppression order.
PROPOSED MARYLAND STATUTE
The Joint Committees of the Maryland Judicial Conference and Mary-
land State Bar Association to Implement the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice have recommended the repeal of Article 26, section 12-302(c) 5 0
and the enactment of section 12-3022. 51 The policy favoring the proposed
statute is apparent. Without it, the decision of the trial judge in favor of
suppression, whether correct or erroneous, forecloses the prosecution of
the case and operates as an acquittal. The opportunity for abuse is obvious,
and even without abuse, uncorrectable error is foreign to the usual notions
50. SUPPLEMENTAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIM.
APPEALS.
51. Proposed section 12-302%, Appeals from Certain Interlocutory Orders in
Criminal Cases would provide:
(A) A defendant may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders
entered by a circuit court in a criminal case:
(1) An order granting a new trial when the defendant contends that
the court should have entered a judgment of acquittal.
(2) Any order adverse to the defendant when in the same criminal case
the State appeals pursuant to Section 12-302(C) or pursuant to paragraph 1
of subsection B of this section.
(B) The State may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders
entered by a circuit court in a criminal case:
(1) An order entered before trial which results in the suppression or
exclusion of evidence which the State's Attorney intended to use at trial on
the ground that the evidence was illegally obtained. No appeal shall be
allowed under this paragraph unless the State's Attorney certifies to the
circuit court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that
the suppression or exclusion of the evidence seriously impedes the prose-
cution of one or more of the offenses charged. For purposes of this
paragraph, the trial begins when the jury is impaneled and sworn or when
the judge in a non-jury trial begins to hear evidence. A defendant who is
not otherwise in custody shall be released on his own recognizance pending
the determination of an appeal by the State pursuant to this paragraph
unless the State presents to the circuit court convincing evidence that it is
necessary to require bail or to impose additional conditions of release to
insure that the defendant will abide by the judgment of the appellate court.
If the State seeks further review of an adverse decision on appeal, the
defendant shall be released on the same basis.
(2) An order that grants release, pending sentence or appeal, to a
defendant convicted of an offense in the circuit court.
(C) A defendant may apply for leave to appeal from a bail determination
of the circuit court, including a determination made in exercise of the court's
appellate jurisdiction under Section 12-401 (D), that orders that the defendant
be detained prior to trial or pending sentence or appeal or imposes conditions
of release that result in the defendant's detention prior to trial or pending sentence
or appeal,
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of fair play and justice.52 The result of disallowing a state's appeal is to
force society to reabsorb an accused criminal whose innocence has not been
determined by an adjudication on the merits, but rather by a lapse in the
vroper functioning of the judicial system at its lowest level.53 The proposed
measure would probably result in more convictions. At the very least,
there would be more determinations on the merits, and this would build
morale within the criminal justice system and confidence without. That
there is a general policy of kindness to criminal defendants hardly justifies
the retention of any irrational procedure merely because it can only
operate in favor of a defendant.
Lohss exemplifies further problems the proposed statute would cor-
rect. The hearing judge, dubious as to the legality of the arrests, granted
the motion to suppress because the circumstances, in his opinion, did not
fall within the exigent circumstances necessary to justify a warrantless
search. 54 The Court of Special Appeals disagreed and found that the
probable cause requirements of the two-prong Aguilar5 test were met,
and thus the arrest and the search incident to it were legal. 56 The Court
of Appeals reversed on other grounds and the correctness of the determi-
nation of the Court of Special Appeals was not reviewed. As a result of
the reversal, law enforcement agencies are placed in an untenable position.
They can follow the hearing judge's ruling and obtain a warrant in all
similar situations. This course of action might not always be available,
and evidence and resultant prosecutions could be lost because of the cur-
tailment of legal police activity. Criminal justice is not aided when law
enforcement agencies are forced to abandon practices and procedures that,
but for the lack of appellate review, would be perfectly legal. The second
alternative open to law enforcement agencies is to continue the practice
or procedure ruled illegal by the trial court in the hope that another trial
court would uphold the practice, and an aggrieved defendant would appeal
and furnish the State an opportunity for review. This is as undesirable as
the first course of action, because the law enforcement agency, not the
courts, would determine which decisions it would abide by and which it
would ignore. This is precisely what happened in Waugh v. State.5 The
contrasts of the results in Lohss and Waugh could not be more clear.
52. See Dowling, Extending the State's Right to Appeal in Criminal Cases in
Illinois, 42 CHi. B. Rc. 361, 364 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Dowling].
53. For a discussion of the evils inherent to acquittals on technical grounds,
see, Dowling, supra note 52, at 366.
54. 19 Md. App. at 501, 313 A.2d at 94.
55. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
56. 19 Md. App. at 502-06, 313 A.2d at 95-97.
57. 275 Md. 22, 338 A.2d 268 (1974). The trial court denied defendant's
motion to suppress evidence. The denial became the subject of appeal because,
as in Lohss, the evidence was marijuana, and if the defendant were able to success-
fully suppress the contraband, the State, as in Lohss, would be unable to proceed
with the prosecution. The facts are strikingly similar. The Maryland State Police
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The difference in result hinges on the decision of a trial judge on a pre-
trial motion, one foreclosing prosecution, the other sending the matter to
trial. The fragile perception of the judicial system as the means of insur-
ing a stable society cannot endure if seemingly capricious questions of
procedure rather than the facts that brought the matter before the courts
determine whether a defendant faces incarceration.
The current system may even result in preventable new trials that
add congestion to already overloaded trial dockets. Trial judges know-
ing that the State cannot appeal the grant of a motion to suppress evi-
dence may, in close cases, deny the motion knowing that the defendant
may appeal if he is convicted. If the State were allowed to appeal, the
problems associated with new trials caused by improper denials of motions
to suppress would be obviated. Appeals and new trials would not dis-
appear, but if the challenges concerning the admissibility of evidence could
occur prior to trial, the issue would be closed promptly. The issue of guilt
or innocence would be thoroughly and fairly resolved at trial, and any
appeals would be on more abstract grounds. Additionally, the proposed
measure would develop uniformity within the State as to what constitutes
an illegal search and seizure and would allow the formulation of a defini-
tive body of law on the subject that would aid judges in their decisions.
The need for review on the point is again highlighted by the difference of
opinion between the trial judges in the Lohss and Waugh cases over
whether similar searches were valid. That two Anne Arundel County
judges are unable to agree is indicative of the differences that can be
expected to occur throughout the state; thus, without appellate review,
a defendant's freedom or incarceration may be determined according to
the jurisdiction where he is brought to trial. Just as the defendant should
not be deprived of guaranteed rights because of locale, neither should the
people of any political subdivision have more exposure to alleged criminals
because of differing judicial interpretations of the search and seizure law.
Passage of the proposed bill would be the legislative determination that
the courts have requested.
were informed by a detective in the Tucson, Arizona Police Department that a
passenger was going to arrive at Friendship (Baltimore-Washington International)
Airport with a shipment of marijuana. A detailed description of the passenger
(Waugh) and his luggage was given. Although the claim check numbers were not
included in the description, the description was sufficiently particular to identify the
defendant. Waugh was arrested in the baggage area after he had claimed the
suitcases. The trial court denied Waugh's motion to suppress and on appeal, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed. 20 Md. App. 682, 318 A2d 204 (1974). The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed because the information leading to the Maryland
search was the result of an unconstitutional search in Tucson and therefore, should
have been excluded under the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 275
Md. at 30, 338 A.2d 268. Accord, Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 337 A2d 100
(1975), Carter v. State, 274 Md. 411, 337 A.2d 415 (1975). If the original motion
had been granted, no body of case law would have developed because of section
12 -302(c). Cf. Lohss v. State, 272 Md. at 114, 321 A.2d at 535.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In the leading article"s favoring appeals by the State, Professor
Justin Miller states:
Most members of the legal profession are willing to admit that the
administration of criminal justice, as a whole, needs improvement.
Our greatest difficulty lies in the unwillingness or inability of some
others to understand that only by making changes in particular rules
and practice, each of which by itself may seem trifling or insignificant,
can we improve the administration of the whole. 59
Opponents of state appeals rely on two principal detriments: the hardship
on the defendant and the negation of the benefit of jury trial. 60 The
latter difficulty is clearly not created by the proposed statute. Because
the jury is not empaneled at the pretrial motion stage of the proceedings,
the jury function would not be impaired.6 1 In fact, interlocutory appeals
may promote the jury function: after the state has appealed, the jury will
be presented with all the admissible evidence and will, therefore, be better
58. Miller, Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as Miller].
59. Id. at 512.
60. See, e.g., ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 62, 71 (1939); Orfield,
Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases, 15 ORE. L. R-v. 306 (1936) [hereinafter cited
as Orfield]; Kronenburg, Right of State Appeal in Criminal Cases, 49 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 473, 479 (1959).
61. There is no state guarantee protecting criminal defendants from double
jeopardy. Under the common law in Maryland, a defendant could not be placed in
jeopardy after there had been a final verdict of either acquittal or conviction on an
adequate charging instrument. Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425, 435 (1863); State
v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 220 A.2d 304 (1966) ; Smith v. State, 1 Md. App. 297,
229 A.2d 723 (1967); Greathouse v. State, 5 Md. App. 675, 249 A.2d 207 (1969).
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), on remand, 8 Md. App. 388,
260 A.2d 86 (1969), struck down the earlier formulation of the double jeopardy rule
enunciated in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and the common law
doctrine that had been applied in Maryland through Greathouse. In Benton, the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was made applicable to the States
through the fourteenth amendment. 395 U.S. at 794.
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended to grant the
United States the right of appeal in criminal cases subject only to constitutional
restraints. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975). The double jeopardy
standard delineated in Wilson is that a bar to Government appeals under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 "attaches only where there is a danger of subjecting the defendant to a second
trial for the same offense . . . ." Id. at 336. Under the Supreme Court test, there
would be no constitutional barrier to such an appeal by the prosecution. In an
appeal from a grant of a pretrial suppression order, there is no threat of either
multiple punishment or successive prosecution. The appeal of a pretrial suppression
order would increase the probability of conviction and subject the defendant to
continuing hardship, but the "defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an
error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial
before a second trier of fact." Id. at 345 (footnote omitted), citing Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed,
336 U.S. 934 (1949). Because of the requirements of the proposed statute, the
appeal would necessarily occur before the first trial and there would be no question
of constitutional infirmities in the procedure.
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able to judge the guilt or innocence of the accused. The former problem
is of more concern. There will be some hardship on the defendant if the
State is given the right to appeal. Orfield opposes giving the State the
right of appeal, because the State should not be allowed to take advantage
of its own faulty procedures at the expense of the defendant. 62 To some,
this is an appealing argument, but to others, it is outrageous that the
public's protection from a criminal should be lost for such a trivial and
irrational purpose. The requirement in the proposed statute that the
prosecutor certify that the appeal is necessary and not frivolous should
help preserve the State's good faith.
Professor Miller suggests two alternative reasons that explain why
legislation has not been enacted allowing the right of appeal. First, society
is less concerned with the ability of the State to prosecute criminal cases
fully than with the protections afforded the defendant. 63 Even now only
half of the states allow appeals from suppression orders - orders critical
to many criminal proceedings. The second reason that Professor Miller
suggests to explain the lack of State action is that most state legislators
are lawyers, whose experience in criminal law has been as defense attor-
neys. Professor Miller asserts that, because of a desire to protect their
own interests, they have thwarted any attempts to give the State more
equality in the criminal law. 64 For whatever the reasons, Lohss reem-
phasizes the need for a statutory revision. The proposed statute responds
to a need that has been apparent since Adams. The trend towards grant-
ing the State a right of appeal is growing. The mandate in Lohss from
the Court of Appeals to the Legislature is manifest: "If a broader right
of review is necessary in the interest of criminal justice, it must be
granted by the Legislature. ' 65 The amendment has been proposed and
all that remains is for the Legislature to enact the proposal and remove
an impediment to the State's ability to fully - and fairly - prosecute
a criminal trial.
62. Orfield, supra note 60, at 310.
63. Miller, supra note 58, at 501.
64. Id. at 502.
65. 272 Md. at 120, 321 A.2d at 539, quoting Adams, Barshack and Mather.
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